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TRADEMARK SURVEY EVIDENCE: REVIEW OF
CURRENT TRENDS IN THE NINTH CIRCUIT
Robert H. Thornburgt
INTRODUCTION
In a field often vacant of any direct evidence to support claims or
defenses, survey evidence represents an important consideration for
trademark counsel. With evidence of actual confusion or dilution
scant in trademark disputes, the evidence afforded by survey evidence
is often invaluable. Surveys represent the most scientific means of
measuring relevant consumers' subjective mental associations by
attempting to recreate the potential purchasing environment in which
a purported trademark or trade dress is found within a given market.'
Selection of a survey expert, preparation of survey protocol, and
implementation of the actual survey, often determine whether a party
will succeed or fail at the summary judgment stage of a dispute.
In the Ninth Circuit, "surveys in trademark cases may be
considered so long as they are "conducted according to accepted
principles."3  Although historically considered hearsay, survey
evidence is now admissible under Federal Rule of Evidence 7034 and
t Robert H. Thornburg is a Litigation Associate with the Intellectual Property law firm
of Allen, Dyer, Doppelt, Milbrath & Gilchrist, P.A. in Orlando, Florida. Mr. Thornburg
received his B.S. in Chemical Engineering, cum laude, from the University of Notre Dame
(1999), his J.D., with honors, from the University of Florida (2002), and his L.L.M. in
Intellectual Property Law, with honors, from The John Marshall Law School (2004).
1. 5 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION
§ 32:158 (4th ed. 2003).
2. See, e.g., Ways & Means, Inc. v. IVAC Corp., 506 F. Supp. 697, (N.D. Cal. 1979)
(granting defendant's motion for summary judgment because plaintiff's telephone survey failed
to meet acceptable standards to create genuine issue of material fact).
3. Prudential Ins. Co. v. Gibraltar Fin. Corp., 694 F.2d 1150, 1156 (9th Cir. 1982)
(finding that district court improperly excluded trademark survey evidence conducted by
Prudential to show that between 14 and 31 percent of public identified its Gibraltar logo as a
source of its insurance services).
4.
The facts or data in the particular case upon which an expert bases an opinion or
inference may be those perceived by or made known to the expert at or before the
hearing. If of a type reasonably relied upon by experts in the particular field in
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is specifically discussed in the Advisory Committee notes 5
According to the rule, the offeror of a survey has the burden of proof
to show that the survey was conducted accordingly to acceptable
survey principles.6 More specifically, the offer must show:
(i) the proper universe was examined;
(ii) a representative sample was drawn from that universe;
(ii) the mode of questioning the interviewees was proper;
(iv) the persons conducting the survey are recognized experts;
(v) the data gathered was accurately reported;
(vi) the sample design was correct;
(vi) the actual questionnaire given to interviewees was not
leading; and
(viii)the overall interviews were performed in accordance with
objective statistics in the applicable field.7
Apart from these factors, the survey itself must "replicate[] the
real world setting" in which the actual purchasing decision for the
8good or service occurs.
Currently, three types of environments exist for conducting
trademark surveys: the Mall-Intercept Survey, the Telephone Survey,
and the Central Location Survey. In addition, the concept of Internet-
forming opinions or inferences upon the subject, the facts or data need not be
admissible in evidence .
FED. R. EVID. 703.
5. "The rule also offers a more satisfactory basis for ruling upon the admissibility of
public opinion poll evidence. Attention is directed to the validity of the techniques employed
rather than to relatively fruitless inquiries whether hearsay is involved." 51 F.R.D. 315, 404
(1971).
6. Ways & Means, Inc., 506 F. Supp. at 704.
7. Id. (citing 1 J. Moore, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE §2.71 (2d ed. 1974)).
8. YKK Corp. v. JungWoo Zipper Co., 213 F. Supp. 2d 1195, 1203 (C.D. Cal. 2002)
(finding it proper to question commercial clothing manufacturers, rather than the ultimate
purchaser, in ascertaining whether defendant's trade name on zipper created actual confusion
with plaintiff's mark).
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based surveys has been suggested,9 with some courts outside of the
Ninth Circuit beginning to accept this format.1° Apart from Internet-
based surveys, currently accepted surveys require tremendous
financial and logistical resources. For example, current survey
experts in California charge between $450 to $600 per hour and
require support staff billing at rates ranging between $200-300 in
orchestrating the actual surveys. With the addition of trademark
counsel assisting in preparation of survey protocol, and the need for
multiple survey sites throughout a geographic area, it is little wonder
why the most basic of surveys cost in the hundreds of thousands of
dollars.
Despite their costs, survey evidence has become a mainstay in
trademark disputes within the Ninth Circuit. Surveys have been
regularly used within the Ninth Circuit to test a variety of issues
inherent in trademark law including:
(1) whether a mark or trade dress has achieved secondary
meaning,"
(2) whether a "famous" mark has been diluted by a dissimilar
product or service,
12
(3) whether a mark is generic or identifies a specific source for
a good or service, 13 and
(4) whether use of a mark creates consumer confusion.1 4
Surveys have been used in jurisdictions outside the Ninth Circuit
to test whether a purported trade dress element is functional. 5 Thus,
9. Robert H. Thornburg, Trademark Surveys: Development of Computer-Based Survey
Methods, 4 J. MARSHALL REv. INTELL. PROPER. L. 91 (2005).
10. See, e.g., 1-800 Contacts, Inc. v. WhenU.Com, 69 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1337 (S.D.N.Y.
2003); see also MasterCard Int'l, Inc. v. First Nat'l Bank of Omaha, Inc., Nos. 02 CIV. 3691
(DLC), 03 CIV. 707 (DLC), 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2485, at *28 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 23, 2004).
11. See, e.g., GrupoGigante SADeCVv. Dallo &Co.,391 F.3d 1088,1107 n.1 (9th Cir.
2004) (Graber, J., concurring).
12. See, e.g., Avery Dennison Corp. v. Sumpton, 189 F.3d 868, 879-80 (9th Cir. 1999).
13. See, e.g., Stuhlbarg Int'l Sales Co. Inc., v. John D. Brush & Co., 240 F.3d 832, 840
(9th Cir. 2001).
14. See, e.g., Clicks Billiards, Inc. v. Sixshooters, Inc., 251 F.3d 1252, 1265 (9th Cir.
2001).
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survey evidence has been employed in almost every aspect of
trademark law.
The Ninth Circuit's uniqueness with regard to trademark surveys
is based largely upon its almost "carte blanche" refusal to exclude
survey evidence based upon technical deficiencies. Unlike other
circuits, the Ninth Circuit has pronounced that a survey's "[t]echnical
unreliability goes to the weight accorded the survey, not its
admissibility."'16 A district court's exclusion of a trademark survey
due to unreliability often creates reversible error, as the Ninth Circuit
has stood firm that such discrepancies should be evaluated by the
fact-finder. 17  Thus, issues relating to potentially leading survey
questions or improperly limited geographic area in which the survey
was conducted only go to the survey's overall value.' 8 This is directly
opposite to most other circuits, where technical irregularities lead to a
finding of inadmissibility. 19 In analyzing what "weight" to give a
trademark survey, courts within the Ninth Circuit look towards a
variety of factors, including, but not limited to the overall survey
design and experience of the surveyor.20
Based upon the unique treatment and use of survey evidence
within the Ninth Circuit, this paper provides a comprehensive review
of current trends and issues inherent to performing a trademark survey
for use at trial. Specifically, this paper seeks to articulate the pitfalls
of the past and highlight the importance of preparation prior to
introducing a trademark survey into evidence. Part I of the paper
provides a general background relating to preparing trademark
surveys within the Ninth Circuit, with emphasis on treatment of non-
litigation surveys. Part II outlines the pitfalls associated with
conducting secondary meaning surveys and how to properly quantify
the relevant survey universe. Part III discusses the use of survey
evidence to test consumer confusion and the general result required to
15. Windmill Corp. v. Kelly Foods Corp., Nos. 94-5874/94-5890, 95-4137, 1996 U.S.
App. LEXIS 3473, at *14--15 (6th Cir. Jan. 26, 1996).
16. Prudential Ins. Co. v. Gibraltar Fin. Corp., 694 F.2d 1150, 1156 (9th Cir. 1982)
(emphasis added).
17. See, e.g., Wendt v. Host Int'l, Inc., 125 F.3d 806, 814 (9th Cir. 1997) (explaining that
the district court's refusal to allow jury to review survey evidence was "abuse of discretion").
18. See, e.g., Southland Sod Farms v. Stover Seed Co., 108 F.3d 1134, 1142-43 (9th Cir.
1997) (reversing and remanding due to lower court's exclusion of plaintiff's consumer survey,
due to issues with survey universe, potentially leading questions, and the fact that the survey
was limited only to Southern California market).
19. See generally, Simon Prop. Group L.P. v. MySimon, Inc., 104 F. Supp. 2d 1033 (S.D.
Ind. 2000).
20. E. & J. Gallo Winery v. Gallo Cattle Co., 967 F.2d 1280, 1292-93 (9th Cir. 1992).
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find a likelihood of confusion. Part IV discusses use of survey
evidence to show whether or not a mark is generic. Part V comments
upon the general distrust within the Ninth Circuit for surveys testing
actual dilution. Part VI provides a general conclusion and overall
remarks of the future role of survey evidence within the Ninth Circuit.
I. GENERAL PRINCIPLES REGARDING SURVEY EVIDENCE
As stated previously, the true value of survey evidence rests
upon its ability to gauge the mental associations and reactions of
prospective purchasers.21 Without evidence of actual confusion or
dilution, parties asserting trademark or trade dress rights must look
towards circumstantial evidence to support their claims. Often, due to
the costs associated with trademark surveys within the Ninth Circuit,
parties will attempt to circumvent the need for a full-blown survey.
For example, a party may attempt to use a marketing survey or an
industry survey not prepared for the purposes of the dispute. In
addition, parties often will attempt to use a survey conducted in an
unrelated litigation, as evidence in a subsequent dispute.
While the Ninth Circuit has consistently stated that the issues
with surveys go to their weight as opposed to their admissibility,22 the
Circuit has nonetheless frowned upon circumventing a litigation
specific survey. Rather, current trends suggest that district courts
within the Ninth Circuit prefer multiple-surveys that are litigation
specific, conducted within several geographic areas and at large
metropolitan areas throughout the country.
A. Need for Multiple Surveys to Test Distinct Consumer Groups
and Geographic Areas
When a purported mark or dress is purchased by two distinct
consumer populations, courts within the Ninth Circuit often suggest
the need for more than one survey. In Trovan, Ltd. v. Pfizer, Inc.,
plaintiff asserted trademark infringement claims against Pfizer for use
of the mark TROVAN. a3 Because Trovan developed drugs for both
humans and animals, plaintiff conducted not one, but two trademark
surveys to show confusion.24 While the survey's methodology was
criticized by defendant for not properly testing confusion in the
21. MCCARTHY, supra note 1.
22. Prudential Ins. Co. v. Gibraltar Fin. Corp., 694 F.2d 1150, 1156 (9th Cir. 1982).
23. Trovan, Ltd. v. Pfizer, Inc., No. CV-98-0094 LGB (MCx), 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
7522 (C.D. Cal. May 24, 2000).
24. Id. at *69-70.
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market, the court found the two separate surveys to test the two
groups who ultimately prescribed Trovan goods as evidence of
consumer confusion.25 Similarly, in Southland Sod Farms v. Stover
Seed Co., the plaintiff asserted Lanham Act claims for its turf sod,
implementing a two-phase survey interviewing both commercial
landscape professionals, as well as homeowners likely to purchase
sod.26
When asserting that a purported trade dress or mark has achieved
secondary meaning nationwide, the plaintiff must at least conduct
multiple trademark surveys in major metropolitan areas throughout
the country.27 Logically, the larger the number of metropolitan areas
surveyed, the more reliable such multiple surveys are towards
establishing secondary meaning or confusion.28 In Wendt v. Host
International, Inc., actor George Wendt ("Norm!"), formerly from the
sitcom Cheers, asserted trade dress rights against defendant for its
various airport restaurants under that sitcom name.29  In order to
ascertain whether the sitcom had trade dress in the bar style, Wendt
executed two surveys at the defendant's Cleveland and Kansas City
airport establishments. 30  The Ninth Circuit found that the surveys
would be admissible as evidence of consumer association, despite the
lower court's exclusion of the results.31
Finally, both parties will conduct opposing surveys on the issue
of secondary meaning, both of which can be used by the court to
ascertain whether sufficient consumer association exists.32  In Levi
Strauss & Co. v. Blue Bell, Inc., "both Strauss and Blue Bell
employed independent survey organizations to conduct surveys of
purchasers of children's shirts" to ascertain whether Strauss could
claim secondary meaning for its red tab on shirts.33 Upon review of
25. Id. at *70.
26. Southland Sod Farms v. Stover Seed Co., 108 F.3d 1134, 1142 (9th Cir. 1997).
27. Acad. of Motion Picture Arts and Sci. v. Creative House Promotions, Inc., 944 F.2d
1446, 1455-46 (9th Cir. 1991) (finding that multiple surveys conducted in Los Angeles, New
York, and Chicago helped show secondary meaning throughout country).
28. See, e.g., E. & J. Gallo Winery v. Gallo Cattle Co., 967 F.2d 1280, 1292 (9th Cir.
1992) (finding that surveys conducted in 35 metro areas created strong evidence of actual
confusion); see also Locomotor U.S.A., Inc. v. Korus Co., Nos. 93-56032, 93-56622, 1995 U.S.
App. LEXIS 401 (9th Cir. Jan 6, 1995) (finding that survey limited to only the San Francisco
area was of no value).
29. Wendt v. Host Int'l, Inc., 125 F.3d 806, 808-09 (9th Cir. 1997).
30. Id. at 814.
31. Id.
32. See Levi Strauss & Co. v. Blue Bell, Inc., 778 F.2d 1352, 1358 (9th Cir. 1985).
33. Id. at 1361.
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the format of both surveys, the lower court placed greater weight on
the findings of Blue Bell's survey.a4 However, the court further
employed both surveys as evidence that there was no reasonable
likelihood of consumer confusion with regard to Blue Bell's shirt
tabs.35 Thus, the Ninth Circuit has employed not only an alleged
infringing mark user's survey to disprove trademark rights, but also
has used a purported trademark holder's own survey as evidence of
no secondary meaning.
B. Surveys Conducted for Non-Litigation Purposes or for
Another Case, Often Not Accorded Weight Within the Ninth
Circuit
A survey offered by a purported mark holder as evidence of
confusion or secondary meaning is often accorded little weight when
it was developed for another case. 6  Similarly, in Thane
International, Inc. v. Trek Bicycle Corp., while the asserting mark
holder had conducted three magazine-based surveys prior to litigation
as a marketing tool to ascertain the strength of its brand name, the
mark holder nonetheless was forced to commission a litigation survey
in order to show confusion.37 In Avery Dennison Corp. v. Sumpton,
the Ninth Circuit severely criticized plaintiff Avery Dennison's
submission of three market research studies to show brand awareness,
finding that plaintiff failed to meet its burden to show its marks were
sufficiently famous to support its dilution claims.3a Specifically, the
Avery Dennison court distrusted Plaintiffs non-litigation specific
surveys because they interviewed former purchasers of its office
products, rather than questioning all potential purchasers of the
category of office products in question. 9
However, not all Ninth Circuit precedent completely excludes
outside surveys. In Coca-Cola Co. v. Overland, Inc., plaintiff Coca-
Cola relied upon an unrelated survey implemented in another case to
show that its mark, COKE, was not generic. 40 While not completely
clear why the Ninth Circuit chose to employ the non-litigation
specific survey, the court did note that the survey evidence was based
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. See M2 Software, Inc. v. M2 Communications, L.L.C., 281 F. Supp. 3d 1166, 1177
(C.D. Cal. 2003).
37. Thane Int'l Inc. v. Trek Bicycle Corp., 305 F.3d 894, 899, 902 (9th Cir. 2002).
38. Avery Dennison Corp. v. Sumpton, 189 F.3d 868, 879 (9th Cir. 1999).
39. Id.
40. Coca-Cola Co. v. Overland, Inc., 692 F.2d 1250, 1254 n. 1I (9th Cir. 1982).
2005]
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upon a litigation survey conducted for the case E.I. DuPont de
Nemours & Co. v. Yoshida International, Inc.,41 argued before the
Eastern District of New York.42 Thus, while it is possible to admit as
evidence, a purported trademark holder should be wary of introducing
a non-litigation specific survey in attempting to prove either
confusion or secondary meaning.
C. In Selecting the Proper Survey Environment, Both Mall-
Intercept and Telephone Surveys Are Generally Accepted
Within the Circuit
By far, the two most popular environments in which to conduct
trademark surveys within the Ninth Circuit are the Mall-Intercept
Survey and Telephone Survey. While it appears that some form of
computer-based survey may have been used and accepted by the court
in Playboy Enterprises, Inc. v. Netscape Communications
Corporation,43 the Ninth Circuit has not directly found Internet-based
surveys to be admissible. However, the survey in Thane
International" highlights the court's acceptance and encouragement
of Mall-Intercept Surveys. In Trek, the trademark holder's expert
conducted the survey in eight shopping malls throughout the United
States.45 Based on the survey evidence, the Ninth Circuit reversed the
lower court's grant of summary judgment against Trek.46
Similar to the Thane survey, admission of the Mall-Intercept
Survey in E. & J. Gallo Winery v. Gallo Cattle Co. further
demonstrates the Ninth Circuit's general acceptance of the survey
environment. 47  There, survey expert Mervin Field conducted an
exhaustive survey of 2500 adult shoppers at 35 different shopping
malls throughout the United States.48 Accordingly, the court found
that the survey constituted reliable evidence of actual confusion.49
41. 393 F. Supp. 502, 526 n.54 (E.D.N.Y. 1975).
42. Coca-Cola Co., 692 F.2d at 1254 n. 11.
43. Playboy Enters., Inc. v. Netscape Communications Corp., 354 F.3d 1020 (9th Cir.
2004).
44. See Thane Int'l, Inc. v. Trek Bicycle Corp, 305 F.3d. 894, 902 (9th Cir. 2002). Note
that the survey expert selected eight locales located in major metropolitan areas throughout the
country to demonstrate national recognition of Trek's trade name as a source of bicycles. Id.
45. Id.
46. Id. at 902-03.
47. E. & J. Gallo Winery v. Gallo Cattle Co., 967 F.2d 1280, 1292 (9th Cir. 1992).
48. Id.
49. Id. at 1293.
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Mall-Intercept Surveys are generally conducted when the
disputed trademark or trade dress is used in connection with the sale
and promotion of a general consumer good. Typical Mall-Intercept
Surveys require a team of interviewers who screen a desired
demographic within the general mall patron population to obtain the
appropriate quota that represents the typical purchaser of the
implicated goods or services. 50 The main benefit of mall-based
surveys is that they allow direct interaction between consumers and
the trademark elements alleged to have secondary meaning or be the
cause of consumer confusion.5 ' Such surveys require the direct
supervision of the survey expert, and should be conducted in multiple
mall facilities when asserting national trademark awareness.
Similar to Mall-Intercept Surveys, the Ninth Circuit has also
Facilities-based surveys located in or around the type of venue
specific to the goods or services sold under a purported trademark or
trade dress. In Clicks Billiards, Inc. v. SixShooters, Inc., the Ninth
Circuit evaluated a survey to establish trade dress rights in the visual
look and appearance of Plaintiff's billiards parlor.53 Plaintiff's expert,
Dr. Sandra Cogan, conducted the survey at Plaintiffs billiards
establishment.54 The Ninth Circuit overruled the district court's
assessment that the survey had little or no value, and found that the
way the survey was conducted was admissible.55 As discussed
previously, the Ninth Circuit also accepted a similar Facilities-based
Survey location in Wendt v. Host International, Inc.56 In Wendt, the
court found admissible surveys conducted in the alleged trade dress
infringer's Cheers-styled restaurants located at both the Cleveland
and Kansas City airports.57
In addition to Mall-Intercept or Facility-based Surveys, courts
within the Ninth Circuit have also accepted the Telephone Survey.58
In Ways & Means, Inc. v. IVAC Corp., the Northern District of
California found that a telephone-based survey was an acceptable
50. See generally, Pep Boys Manny, Moe & Jack of Cal. v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co.,
No. 01-CV-5614, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5925, at *28 (E.D. Pa. Apr. 5, 2002).
51. Thornburg, supra note 9, at 94.
52. See, e.g., Thane Int'l, Inc. v. Trek Bicycle Corp., 305 F.3d. 894, 902 (9th Cir. 2002).
53. Clicks Billiards, Inc. v. Sixshooters Inc., 251 F.3d 1252, 1262-64 (9th Cir. 2001).
54. Id. at 1262.
55. Id. at 1263-64.
56. Wendt v. Host Int'l, Inc., 125 F.3d 806 (9th Cir. 1997).
57. Id. at 814.
58. Ways & Means, Inc. v. IVAC Corp., 506 F. Supp. 697, 703-04 (N.D. Cal. 1979).
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form of survey environment.5 9 Telephone Surveys are also widely
recognized and admitted in other jurisdictions.6 ° In fact, they have
been generally used and accepted in trademark disputes for over forty
years.6  The true benefits of a trademark survey are its ease of
supervision, and that the information collected can be easily recorded
and verified. Unlike the logistics and travel costs associated with
Mall-Intercept Surveys, Telephone Surveys are often less expensive
and can be performed in less time.
Thus, while the Ninth Circuit has generally accepted Mall-
Intercept Surveys, Facilities-based Surveys, and Telephone Surveys,
there exists no evidence why other surveys would not be similarly
accepted. It is very likely that, within the next five years, the Ninth
Circuit will confront an Internet-based survey format. While it
remains unclear what course the court would take with such a survey,
it is likely the court would find that such a new format would go to
weight, rather than admissibility.
I. TESTING FOR SECONDARY MEANING
Secondary meaning surveys are by far the most accepted and
frequently used type of survey in trademark disputes. In this type of
survey, the goal is to ascertain whether consumers associate a certain
word, symbol, collocation of color, design, or good, as emanating
from a single source.62 The issue of timing as to when to conduct a
trademark survey to ascertain secondary meaning is of crucial
importance. While not directly discussed by the Ninth Circuit, the
Second Circuit has provided that a timely secondary meaning survey
should be conducted at or near a purported trademark holder's first
knowledge of a junior use of its mark.63 In STX, Inc. v. Trik Stik, Inc,
the Northern District of California stated that while "[i]t is unrealistic
to expect a plaintiff to generate market studies until a potential
infringer is discovered," courts should accept a timely secondary
meaning survey conducted after filing a trademark suit.64 Thus, it
59. Id.
60. See, e.g., Dick's Sporting Goods, Inc. v. Dick's Clothing & Sporting Goods, Inc., No.
98-1653, 1999 U.S. App. LEXIS 19942, at *12-15 (4th Cir. Aug. 20, 1999).
61. Thomas Pride Mills, Inc. v. Monsanto Co., 155 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 205, 207-08 (N.D.
Ga. 1967).
62. RJR Foods, Inc. v. White Rock Corp., 603 F.2d 1058, 1059 (2d Cir. 1979).
63. See 20th Century Wear, Inc. v. Sanmark-Stardust, Inc., 747 F.2d 81, 90 (2nd Cir.
1984).
64. STX, Inc. v. Trik Stik, Inc., 708 F. Supp. 1551, 1559 (N.D. Cal. 1988).
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remains imperative that a plaintiff conduct a trademark survey soon
after the filing of the complaint.65
Under Ninth Circuit law, trademark surveys can provide "the
most persuasive evidence of secondary meaning. 66  The Ninth
Circuit has gone so far as to say that "survey evidence will often
provide the most persuasive evidence of consumer recognition and
association. 67  However, courts within the Ninth Circuit also
recognize that secondary meaning can be proven through
circumstantial evidence, apart from a survey.68  When there is
sufficient evidence through long-term use and large-scale advertising,
for instance, a trademark survey may not be required to prove
secondary meaning.69 Likewise, proof of copying of a mark or dress
by the alleged infringer "strongly supports an inference of secondary
meaning," lessening the need for a survey.7 °
Regardless of whether a trademark survey is in fact required
under Ninth Circuit precedent, such evidence is clearly one of many
ways to establish secondary meaning, which also include:
(i) direct consumer testimony;
(ii) exclusivity of use;
(iii) manner of use;
(iv) length of use;
(v) level of advertising;
65. See id.
66. Grupo Gigante SA De CV v. Dallo & Co., 391 F.3d 1088, 1107 n.1 (9th Cir. 2004)
(Graber, J., concurring) (citing Comm. for Idaho's High Desert, Inc. v. Yost, 92 F.3d 814, 822
(9th Cir. 1996)) (finding that although the survey only established that plaintiff's customer's
were familiar with its GIGANTE chain of supermarket stores in Mexico, the survey was
nonetheless admissible).
67. See also Duncan McIntosh Co. v. Newport Dunes Marina L.L.C., 324 F. Supp. 2d
1078, 1084 (9th Cir. 2004) (emphasis added); Vision Sports, Inc. v. Melville Corp., 888 F.2d
609, 615 (9th Cir. 1989) (citing Levi Strauss & Co. v. Blue Bell, Inc., 778 F.2d 1352, 1358 (9th
Cir. 1985) ("An expert survey of purchasers can provide the most persuasive evidence on
secondary meaning.")
68. See Duncan McIntosh Co., 324 F. Supp. 2d at 1084; see also MCCARTHY, supra note
I, § 32:190 at 32- 319 to 32-320 (4th ed. 2003).
69. See Sunburst Prods., Inc. v. Derrick Law Co., Nos. 89-56025, 89-56113, 90-55194,
1991 U.S. App. LEXIS 352, at *7 n.4 (9th Cir. Jan. 9, 1991) (citing Clamp Mfg. Co. v. Enco
Mfg. Co., 870 F.2d 512,517 (9th Cir. 1989)).
70. Vision Sports, Inc. v. Melville Corp., 888 F.2d 609, 615 (citing Audio Fidelity, Inc. v.
High Fidelity Recordings, Inc., 283 F.2d 551, 558 (9th Cir. 1960)).
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(vi) amount of sales; and
(vii) establishment in the marketplace.7 '
Whether a trademark or dress can be shown to have achieved
secondary meaning through a survey or any other indicia of consumer
association, the issue is always a question of fact reviewed under the
clearly erroneous standard.72
The Ninth Circuit has ruled that failure to perform a secondary
meaning survey is indeed not fatal, especially when dealing with
higher end products having a recognized quality. In Moscow
Distillery Cristall v. Pepsico, Inc., defendant Pepsi appealed a jury
finding that it infringed Russian-based plaintiffs mark CRISTALL
for vodka, asserting that there was insufficient evidence of secondary
meaning. 73  Pepsi argued that there was no direct evidence that
domestic consumers associated the name CRISTALL with the foreign
distillery, as plaintiff failed to perform a consumer survey.74  The
Ninth Circuit found that although no survey evidence existed, it was
reasonable that consumers would distinguish plaintiff's CRISTALL
name from other Stolichnaya vodkas, and identify plaintiff as the
source. 75  This was due largely to the higher quality of plaintiffs
vodka, especially in comparison to defendant Pepsi's lower grade
Stolichnaya vodka.76 The Ninth Circuit affirmed the lower court,
finding that plaintiff likely had achieved secondary meaning for its
mark.77
A. Quantifying the Relevant Trademark Survey Universe
When evaluating the proper "survey universe" in ascertaining
whether a mark has achieved secondary meaning, the Ninth Circuit
emphasizes that the "nature of the service provided," rather than the
composition of the market to which the plaintiff actively targeted its
71. See Filipino Yellow Pages, Inc. v. Asian Journal Publ'n, Inc., 198 F.3d 1143 (9th Cir.
1999) (finding that plaintiffs evidence of secondary meaning, which did not include a survey,
lacked substantial probative value to find secondary meaning for term FILIPINO YELLOW
PAGES).
72. Clamp Mfg. Co. v. Enco Mfg. Co., 870 F.2d 512, 514 (9th Cir. 1989); see also First
Brands Corp. v. Fred Meyer, Inc., 809 F.2d 1378, 1381 (9th Cir. 1987).
73. Moscow Distillery Cristall v. Pepsico, Inc., 48 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1217 (9th Cir.
1998).
74. Id. at 1219.
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. Id. at 1220.
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services, controls.78 Japan Telecom, Inc. v. Japan Telecom America,
Inc. dealt with a dispute involving two telecommunication service
providers in Southern California, both of which advertised mainly to
the Japanese-American business community.79 The Ninth Circuit
commented that although the composition of the two parties' market
was limited to a specific business community, because the nature of
the services provided was much larger, a proper survey universe
would be larger.
80
As shown below, the Ninth Circuit has discussed a variety of
situations where the value of survey evidence purporting to show
secondary meaning has negligible value because the survey universe
was limited only to the most typical users within the known culture,
rather than the eventual end users or those who make the actual
purchasing decisions.
1. When Dealing with Goods Generally Related to a
Specific Culture, Survey Universe Should Extend
Beyond That Culture to Include Other Potential
Purchasers
Similar to the outcome in Japan Telecom, the Ninth Circuit
recently remanded a trademark dispute based upon an insufficient
survey universe limited only to a specific ethnic background. In
Grupo Gigante SA De CV v. Dallo & Co., the plaintiff, an operator of
a large chain of grocery stores in Mexico called GIGANTE, asserted
that the mark had attained secondary meaning within the United
States.81 In conducting a trademark survey to demonstrate secondary
meaning, plaintiff conducted a small survey consisting of only 78
people in San Diego County.82 The survey universe was limited to
only Spanish-speaking individuals who had recently purchased
Mexican-style food at either a supermarket or similar food store.83 Of
the 78 Spanish-speaking survey respondents, twenty-four asserted that
78. Grupo Gigante SA De CV v. Dallo & Co., 391 F.3d 1088, 1107 (9th Cir. 2004)
(Graber, J., concurring) (citing Japan Telecom, Inc. v. Japan Telecom Am., Inc., 287 F.3d 866,
875 (9th Cir. 2002)).
79. Japan Telecom, Inc. v. Japan Telecom Am., Inc., 287 F.3d 866 (9th Cir. 2002).
80. See id. at 875.
81. Grupo Gigante SA De CV, 391 F.3d at 1091-92.
82. Id. at 1107.
83. Id. (citing Grupo Gigante S.A. de CV. v. Dallo & Co., 119 F. Supp. 2d 1083, 1093
(C.D. Cal. 2000).
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they were aware that GIGANTE was a supermarket located in
Mexico.
84
The nature and value of plaintiffs trademark survey drew sharp
criticism from Circuit Judge Graber. In her concurring opinion,
Graber found that "the survey result [was] highly questionable in
view of its narrowly defined survey population. 85 As the clientele of
a Mexican food store would draw both Hispanic and Non-Hispanic
customers, the relevant universe should not have been limited solely
to Hispanic-Americans.86 Rather, the trademark survey conducted by
plaintiff did nothing more than show a general familiarity by the
Hispanic-American community with the plaintiff's stores in Mexico.
87
Thus, the Ninth Circuit found that the lower court's reliance upon the
trademark survey was "problematic" due to the improper universe,
and found it was only of slight marginal value.88 Accordingly, while
the lower court found that the GIGANTE mark had achieved
sufficient secondary meaning to be "moderately strong," the Ninth
Circuit remanded, finding that the survey evidence was insufficient
due to a deficient survey universe.89
2. Proper Survey Universe Should Extend Beyond the
Alleged Mark Holder's Customer Base
While a limited universe based upon assumptions that only a
specific ethnic group would purchase an implicated good or service is
improper, the probative value of a survey is further limited when a
mark holder uses only its known customer base in the survey.90 In
Avery Dennison v. Sumpton, the trademark survey only focused on
respondents who purchased plaintiffs products. 9' Because such a
universe would inflate the perceived brand awareness of an





87. Grupo Gigante SA De CV, 391 F.3d at 1106.
88. Id. at 1107-08.
89. Id. at 1109.
90. Avery Dennison Corp. v. Sumpton, 189 F.3d 868 (9th Cir. 1999).
91. Id. at 879.
92. Id.
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3. The Survey Universe for Goods or Services Purchased
Typically by Commercial Non-Public Buyers, Should
Include Public or End Users of Such Goods.
Similar to improper limitations based upon ethnicity, secondary
meaning surveys for typically commercial goods should not limit
their universe to only commercial, non-public buyers. In Southland
Sod Farmers v. Stover Seed Co., the court analyzed the declaration of
plaintiff's survey expert regarding consumer association relating to
specific advertisements dealing in turf grass.93  Plaintiff s survey
expert created a two-phase trademark survey, one targeted directly to
home owners who had or planned to install a lawn, while another was
targeted directly at commercial landscape contractors.94
The District Court found that plaintiffs expert declaration was
insufficient to withstand summary judgment, as it was primarily
directed to the lay public, despite the fact that the questioned goods
were directed specifically to a commercial audience. 95 While the
Ninth Circuit found it improper to exclude the declaration altogether,
the court did agree that the proper survey universe would not have
been focused or directed to just a commercial audience. 96 Moreover,
despite serious issues as to the survey's leading questions and limited
geographic scope, the Ninth Circuit found such deficiencies went only
to weight.
97
4. When Dealing with Goods Geared Specifically
Towards an Age Group, Proper Universe Must Extend
Beyond the Age Bracket of the Actual Users of Such
Goods, to Include Those Who Actually Make the
Purchasing Decisions.
When dealing with goods typically geared towards a specific age
group, the Ninth Circuit has warned that the proper universe may
extend beyond the age bracket of the common user of such goods.
98
In Vision Sports, Inc. v. Melville Corp., plaintiff asserted both
trademark and trade dress infringement against defendant Melville
regarding plaintiffs hang tags for its line of clothing catering to
93. Southland Sod Farms v. Stover Seed Co., 108 F.3d 1134, 1142-43 (9th Cir. 1997).
94. Id. at 1142.
95. Id.
96. Id. at 1142-43.
97. Id. at 1143.
98. Vision Sports, Inc. v. Melville Corp., 888 F.2d 609, 615 (9th Cir. 1989).
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skateboard enthusiasts. 99 Plaintiff asserted that Melville's hang-tag,
which included the word STREET in large red block letters over the
word CLOSED in white block letters against a black background, was
too similar to plaintiffs dress.100 Based upon several non-litigation
related surveys submitted by plaintiff, along with other evidence of
awareness of its mark and dress, the District Court issued a
preliminary injunction against defendant's hang-tag.' 10
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit focused on the nature of plaintiffs
survey, and whether it showed secondary meaning.'0 2 First, the Ninth
Circuit found that the background design of a hang-tag, apart from a
prevalent word mark within the hang-tag, could create in the minds of
the consuming public a commercial impression, separate and apart
from the word mark itself.10 3  In conducting trademark surveys,
plaintiff tested whether such consumer association existed by showing
the hang-tag without the word mark, and relying only on the graphic
elements and overall format of the hang-tag itself.'°4  The Ninth
Circuit found that Vision's consumer survey, which limited the test
hang-tags only to the purported source identifying color scheme and
graphic display, was a proper specimen to show secondary
meaning. 105 The court also found that the greater than 80% finding of
consumer association was also probative of secondary meaning. 1
06
However, the court agreed with defendant that the overall
universe was questionable, as it only targeted 10 to 18-year-old males
who participated in or viewed skateboarding events. 0 7  Such
limitations severely narrowed the probative value of the survey.
10 8
The court suggested that if the "survey had included all individuals
ages 15 to 25 who purchase sports wear or active wear, the
percentage of respondents identifying" plaintiffs hang-tag design
would have been less than 80%.109 Moreover, as such sporting goods
for young males would likely be actually purchased by parents or
99. Id. at 611.
100. Id.
101. Id. at 612.
102. See id. at 614-15.
103. Id. at 613.
104. Vision Sports, Inc., 888 F.2d at 613 n.5.




109. Id. (emphasis added).
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guardians, the universe was further suspect." ° However, the court
still affirmed the lower court's finding of secondary meaning, based
upon combining the survey evidence with sales and advertising
evidence proffered by plaintiff.''
B. Required Percentages of Survey Needed to Show Secondary
Meaning.
While the Ninth Circuit in Vision Sports suggested that the 80%
consumer association with the purported trade dress was sufficient in
showing secondary meaning, courts within the Ninth Circuit typically
require lower results in finding sufficient consumer awareness.l12 The
Ninth Circuit in California Cooler, Inc. v. Loretto Winery, Ltd., for
instance, found that plaintiffs asserted mark, "California Cooler,"
had achieved secondary meaning based upon evidence showing that
75% of people questioned in a commissioned survey volunteered that




C. Failure to Offer Survey Evidence to Show Secondary
Meaning
As mentioned previously, unlike with confusion survey
evidence, which is often only "probative," the Ninth Circuit has
recently asserted that survey evidence constitutes "the most
persuasive evidence of secondary meaning."" 4  Accordingly,
numerous district court decisions highlight the reality that without a
valid survey, a descriptive mark or trade dress will likely be found to
lack secondary meaning. In Echo Drain v. Newsted, the Central
District of California found that Echo Drain's failure to offer either an
expert report or survey evidence, led to insufficient evidence for it to
find genuine issues to preclude granting the defendant's motion for
summary judgment." 5
Similarly, in Yellow Cab Co. of Sacramento v. Yellow Cab Co. of
Elk Grove, the Eastern District of California found that plaintiff's
offering of the declaration of a single customer created only limited
110. See Vision Sports, Inc., 888 F.2d at 615.
111. Id.
112. Id.
113. California Cooler, Inc. v. Loretto Winery, Ltd., 774 F.2d 1451, 1456 (9th Cir. 1985)
(affirming lower court grant of preliminary injunction, as district court did not err in finding that
term "California Cooler" was not generic but had achieved secondary meaning).
114. Grupo Gigante SA De CV v. Dallo & Co., 391 F.3d 1088, 1107 n.1 (9th Cir. 2004)
(Graber, J., concurring).
115. Echo Drain v. Newsted, 307 F. Supp. 2d 1116, 1122 (C.D. Cal. 2003).
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probative value as to secondary meaning, compared to the value of a
properly conducted trademark survey.11 6  Thus, trademark surveys
continue to be not only the most persuasive evidence of secondary
meaning, but may be in reality the only means to preclude summary
judgment on the issue under Ninth Circuit precedent. 17
III. EVALUATING LIKELIHOOD OF CONSUMER CONFUSION
Trademark "[s]urveys are commonly introduced as probative
evidence of actual confusion."' 1 8 While the Ninth Circuit does not
require any party to conduct a trademark survey to demonstrate actual
confusion in the market, it does recognize that surveys are valuable
tools to help "bolster" a mark holder's infringement claims." 9
Moreover, the Ninth Circuit has commented that "[t]he lack of survey
evidence counts against finding actual confusion.' 120  Apart from
trademark survey evidence of confusion, the Ninth Circuit also allows
proof of likelihood of confusion through: (i) other evidence of actual
confusion such as consumer telephone calls; (ii) judicial comparison
of both marks or dress; and (iii) the overall context of both uses in the
marketplace.121 Indeed, the Ninth Circuit has suggested that "proof of
exact copying" of a plaintiffs potential mark or dress without any
evidence through survey, may nonetheless be sufficient evidence to
show secondary meaning to accord rights.1
22
The Ninth Circuit has commented that its sole purpose in
evaluating confusion surveys is not to reweigh both survey and
circumstantial evidence of consumer confusion, but rather to ascertain
116. Yellow Cab Co. of Sacramento v. Yellow Cab Co. of Elk Grove, 266 F. Supp. 2d
1199, 1206 (E.D. Cal. 2003).
117. See Levi Strauss & Co. v. Blue Bell, Inc., 778 F.2d 1352, 1358-59 (9th Cir. 1985).
118. Playboy Enters. Inc. v. Netscape Communications Corp., 354 F.3d 1020, 1026 n.28
(9th Cir. 2004) (citing Schering Corp. v. Pfizer, Inc., 189 F.3d 218, 225 (2nd Cir. 1999)); see
also Clicks Billiards, Inc. v. Sixshooters, Inc., 251 F.3d 1252, 1265 (9th Cir. 2001).
119. Morrison Entm't Group, Inc. v. Nintendo of Am., Inc., 56 Fed. Appx. 782, 785 (9th
Cir. 2003) (finding insufficient evidence of consumer confusion, due partially to lack of survey
evidence).
120. Oregon Arms, Inc. v. Oregon Arms Ltd., Nos. 99-35768, 99-35902, 2000 U.S. App.
LEXIS 30215, at *9 (9th Cir. Nov. 27, 2000) (quoting Merriam-Webster, Inc. v. Random
House, Inc., 35 F.3d 65, 72 (2d Cir. 1994)).
121. Dr. Seuss Enters., L.P. v. Penguin Books USA, Inc., 109 F.3d 1394, 1404 n.14 (9th
Cir. 1997) (affirming grant of preliminary injunction despite lack of survey evidence of actual
confusion).
122. Committee for Idaho's High Desert, Inc. v. Yost, 92 F.3d 814, 822-23 (9th Cir. 1996)
(affirming district court finding that name "Committee for Idaho's High Desert" had acquired
secondary meaning, despite lack of survey evidence).
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whether the survey was conducted under accepted principles.123
However, the combination of survey evidence coupled with expert
testimony as to confusion often will outweigh circumstantial evidence
introduced on the issue of consumer confusion. 124 Thus, the Ninth
Circuit views surveys as "ample and legitimate evidence in trademark
cases" for ascertaining whether consumer confusion exists. 25
The circuit has excluded survey results when they result in an
essentially conclusory expert opinion based upon only a handful of
survey questionnaires. 126 In Locomotor U.S.A., Inc. v. Korus
Company, the Ninth Circuit sharply criticized plaintiffs confusion
survey on multiple grounds, finding it showed only de minimis
confusion at best. 27 First, the survey questioned only a handful of
commercial retailers in the form of affidavits, rather than a typical
survey format questionnaire.128 Second, the survey was limited only
to the San Francisco area. 129  Third, the conclusory nature of the
expert's affidavit with regard to confusion was suspect, as it showed
no analysis of the data provided by the handful of retailers
questioned. 130 Finally, as the nature of the implicated products were
inexpensive and purchased by casual shoppers who would invest little
time in the purchasing decision, the survey should have been more
detailed and used a larger number of potential consumers of the
products. 3 ' Thus, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the lower court's
finding that plaintiff Locomotor failed, as a matter of law, to show a
likelihood of consumer confusion.
132
Moreover, the Ninth Circuit has ruled that while confusion
surveys are often a "significant measure of consumer confusion," they
are not in themselves dispositive of the issue of likelihood of
confusion. 133 Sunburst Products, Inc. v. Derrick Law Co. dealt with
an implicated SHARK watch and FREE STYLE watch trade dress
123. Levi Strauss & Co v. Blue Bell, Inc., 778 F.2d 1352, 1360 (9th Cir. 1985).
124. Id.
125. Id. (citing Anti-Monopoly, Inc. v. Gen. Mills Fun Group, Inc., 684 F.2d 1316, 1323
(9th Cir. 1982).
126. See Locomotor U.S.A., Inc. v. Korus Co., Nos. 93-56032, 93-56622, 1995 U.S. App.
LEXIS 401, at *12-13 (9th Cir. Jan. 6, 1995).
127. Id.




132. Locomotor U.S.A., Inc., 1995 U.S. App. LEXIS 401, at * 13-14.
133. Sunburst Prods., Inc. v. Derrick Law Co., Nos. 89-56025, 89-56113, 90-55194, 1991
U.S. App. LEXIS 352, at *23 (9th Cir. Jan. 9, 1991).
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and logo, in which the lower court issued a preliminary injunction
against defendant Derrick Law.' 34  For the preliminary injunction
hearing, plaintiff Sunburst relied greatly on survey evidence
purporting to show consumer confusion between its SHARK watch
and defendant's ReebokVersion3 watch.'35 On appeal, Sunburst
argued that the lower court failed to place significant evidence on its
confusion survey in denying certain portions of its requested
injunction. 136
Finding that the District Court did not improperly weigh
Sunburst's survey evidence during its full evidentiary hearing on the
issue, the Ninth Circuit found that defendants properly raised several
issues regarding the survey's conclusions.1 37 Specifically, the Ninth
Circuit held that survey evidence is not dispositive in itself on the
issue of likelihood of consumer confusion;138the District Court's
visual comparison of both implicated watches, and its finding of
certain dissimilarities, was sufficient to overcome many of the
survey's findings. 39  Accordingly, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the
scope of the District Court's preliminary injunction. 140
A. Percentage of Confusion Likely to Warrant Finding of
Confusion
A trademark survey finding a level of more than 25% of
consumers identifying an implicated mark or dress is associated with
plaintiffs mark or dress, is sufficient evidence of consumer
confusion. 141 In Thane International, Inc. v. Trek Bicycle Corp.,
bicycle manufacturer Trek asserted its trademark rights against Thane
International's line of stationary bikes sold under the name
OrbiTREK. 142  Trek introduced a survey as evidence of actual
confusion between the marks TREK and OrbiTREK. 143 Conducted
by University of Southern California business professor David A.
Stewart, the survey consisted of interviews with 400 people over the
age of 18 who had purchased either a bicycle or exercise equipment
134. Id. at *1.
135. Id. at *23.
136. Id.
137. Id.
138. Id. at *23-24.
139. Sunburst Prods., Inc., 1991 U.S. App. LEXIS 352, at *24.
140. Id. at *25.
141. Thane Int'l, Inc. v. Trek Bicycle Corp., 305 F.3d 894, 902-03 (9th Cir. 2002).
142. Id. at 900.
143. Id. at 902.
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within the last three years, or planned to do so within a year. 44
Stewart's interviews were conducted at shopping malls in eight
metropolitan areas. 1
45
The interviews consisted of showing respondents pictures of
both Trek and Orbitrek products. 146 Upon analysis, Stewart testified
that 27.7% of the respondents were confused with respect to the
source of the OrbiTREK products, based upon the similarity of its
name with TREK. 147 In commenting on the proper weight to accord
the Trek survey, the Ninth Circuit found that a reasonable jury
"could" find that relevant consumers would likely be confused by the
OrbiTREK name. 148 Thus, the court essentially found that as little as
27.7% of confusion, after removal of underlying survey noise through
a control, was sufficient to create evidence of likelihood of
confusion.
149
The Ninth Circuit has also found that confusion between 40%
nationally, and 47% within the relevant geographic use of the mark,
was "eminently trustworthy" in finding actual confusion in the
marketplace. 150 In E. & J. Gallo Winery v. Gallo Cattle Co.,
defendant Gallo Cattle, owned by the younger brother of plaintiff,
appealed the District Court's grant of summary judgment regarding
the use of the GALLO trademark on retail packages of cheese. 151
Prior to its motion for summary judgment, plaintiff E. & J. Gallo
performed a detailed survey organized by expert Mervin Field, which
consisted of interviewing nearly 3,500 adults in 35 different shopping
malls throughout the United States.' 
52
Shown photographs of defendant's cheese label and asked which
"company [the respondent] believe[d] put[] out this cheese," over
40% of individuals nationally, and 45% of those questioned in
California answered the plaintiff.153 Specifically, the interviewees
were shown one of eight labels, four of which contained a disclaimer




147. Thane Int'l, Inc., 305 F.3d at 902-03.
148. Id. at 903.
149. See id. at 902 n.6.
150. E. & J. Gallo Winery v. Gallo Cattle Co., 967 F.2d 1280, 1292-93 (9th Cir. 1992).
151. Id. at 1283.
152. Id. at 1292.
153. Id.
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contain such disclaimer. 154 These figures were both collated by the
expert, and reduced for abnormalities within the results.'5 5 While the
defendant argued that the questions were unduly leading, the court
found the results were not only reliable, but "eminently
trustworthy.'
156
Questions with regard to format of a confusion survey may be
overcome when the results show. a large degree of perceived
confusion. 157 In Academy of Motion Picture Arts and Sciences v.
Creative House Promotions, Inc., plaintiff sought trademark
protection against defendant's "Star Award" which it claimed was too
similar to plaintiff's gold figure "Oscar" statuette. 158 At trial, the
court ruled against plaintiff by finding no confusion. 159 On appeal,
plaintiff asserted that the high instances of 70% confusion found in its
survey warranted reversal or remand. 60 Conducted in the country's
three largest metropolitan areas (namely, New York, Chicago, and
Los Angeles), the survey focused on white-collar professionals who
were associated with both the defendant's Star. Award and the
Oscars. 161
The Ninth Circuit found that the failure of plaintiffs survey to
address confusion by the recipients and later viewers of the award
who were not exposed to defendant's marketing presentations,
nonetheless warranted some evidence of actual confusion. 162  In
addition, other evidence of actual confusion, including phone calls to
plaintiff who believed that the Star Award was bestowed on actors,
created further persuasive proof of confusion. 6 3 Thus, based upon
the large finding of confusion via its survey, in addition to other
outside evidence of actual confusion, the Ninth Circuit found that
plaintiff had created a sufficient showing of confusion among
consumers. 164
154. Id. at 1292 n.6.
155. Id. at 1292.
156. E. & J. Gallo Winery, 967 F.2d at 1292-93.
157. Acad. of Motion Picture Arts and Sci. v. Creative House Promotions, Inc., 944 F.2d
1446, 1455-56 (9th Cir. 1991).
158. Id. at 1449.
159. Id.
160. See id. at 1449, 1455-56.
161. Id. at 1455-56.
162. Id. at 1456.
163. Acad. of Motion Picture Arts and Sci., 944 F.2d at 1456.
164. Id.
TRADEMARK SURVEY EVIDENCE TRENDS
B. Survey Evidence Showing Less Than 10% Confusion Creates
Proof of Non-Infringement
As a general matter, the Ninth Circuit is typically opposed to
employing a survey conducted specifically to prove no actual
confusion between two marks or dress to defeat a claim of likelihood
of consumer confusion. 165 Rather, alleged infringers attempting to
disprove confusion resort to statistically showing how a purported
mark or dress holder's survey in fact shows no likelihood of
confusion.' 66  Typically, survey results finding less than 10%
confusion warrant a finding that the alleged infringing mark or dress
does not create a likelihood of consumer confusion.
167
In Cairns v. Franklin Mint Co., the court found that aggregated
responses to the plaintiffs genericness survey, showing only 6.9% of
respondents believed the questioned service came from a particular
organization, created insufficient evidence of confusion. 168 Similarly,
in Visa International Service Association v. Eastern Financial Credit
Union, 6.7% confusion between two disputed marks was found not
only insufficient to show actual confusion for purposes of preliminary
injunction, but supported a finding of no confusion.169
In analyzing the few cases before the Ninth Circuit which have
analyzed what percentage of confusion is proof of a likelihood of
confusion, the court appears to be consistent that approximately 25%
confusion is not sufficient, when the survey's accuracy has been
validly criticized. The Ninth Circuit in Playboy Enterprises, Inc. v.
Netscape Communications Corp., found that while not before the
court on appeal, an expert's finding of only 22% confusion, along
with valid criticism regarding the handling of the survey, supported a
finding of no likelihood of confusion. 1
70
The Ninth Circuit, in at least one case, has found that survey
results which showed more than 30% consumer confusion, was
165. Century 21 Real Estate Corp. v. Sandlin, 846 F.2d 1175 (9th Cir. 1988) (finding
lower court did not abuse its discretion in denying alleged infringer's request to extend
discovery in order to conduct survey to show no actual confusion).
166. See Playboy Enters., Inc. v. Netscape Communications Corp., 354 F.3d 1020 (9th Cir.
2004).
167. See Cairns v. Franklin Mint Co., 24 F. Supp. 2d 1013, 1040 (C.D. Cal. 1998) (quoting
Sara Lee Corp. v. Kayser-Roth Corp., 81 F.3d 455,467 n.15 (4th Cir. 1996)).
168. Id. at 1040.
169. Visa Int'l Serv. Ass'n v. E. Fin. Fed. Credit Union, 24 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1365, 1368
(9th Cir. 1992).
170. Playboy Enters., Inc. v. Netscape Communications Corp., 354 F.3d 1020, 1026-27
(9th Cir. 2004).
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insufficient to show actual confusion. 171 In Prudential Insurance Co.
v. Gibraltar Financial Corp., the District Court excluded from
evidence Prudential's trademark survey on the issue of actual
confusion, which showed that 14-31% of the public identified
defendant Gibraltar's logo with Prudential.172  The Ninth Circuit
found that the District Court's exclusion of the survey evidence
"failed to prejudice Prudential because the survey showed only that
the Prudential rock and the Gibraltar rock were linked in the public
eye."' 73 As both marks had co-existed for 28 years, the Ninth Circuit
found that the survey evidence proffered by Prudential was
insufficient to show consumer confusion.
74
IV. ASCERTAINING WHETHER A MARK Is GENERIC
"Consumer surveys have become almost de rigeur in litigation
over genericness.' 75  The Ninth Circuit has often looked towards
survey evidence in finding a disputed trademark is still protectable
and not generic. 176 Often, survey evidence is the most prominent and
important evidence available to the court in order to ascertain whether
a mark is generic. 77 While the value of genericness surveys run akin
to secondary meaning surveys, courts within the Ninth Circuit
acknowledging such importance, require specifically framed
questions and certain levels of survey results to deem that a disputed
mark remains protectable.
A. Surveys Testing Genericness Should Ask Whether
Consumers Associate Good with a Brand or With a Type of
Product.
Under Ninth Circuit precedent, purported trademark or trade
dress holders should provide not only a competent survey, but also
expert testimony discussing the survey when attempting to show a
mark is not generic. In Stuhlbarg International Sales Co. v. John D.
171. Prudential Ins. Co. v. Gibraltar Fin. Corp., 694 F.2d 1150, 1155-56 (9th Cir. 1982).
172. Id. at 1155.
173. Id. at 1156 (emphasis added).
174. Id.
175. Big Island Candies, Inc. v. Cookie Comer, 269 F. Supp. 2d 1236, 1250 (D. Haw.
2003) (quoting 2 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR
COMPETITION § 12:14 (4th ed. 2003)).
176. See, e.g., Stuhlbarg Int'l Sales Co., v. John D. Brush & Co., 240 F.3d 832 (9th Cir.
2001) (finding FIRE-SAFE mark was not generic and should be afforded trademark protection
based upon survey evidence).
177. See Big Island Candies, Inc., 269 F. Supp. 2d at 1250.
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Brush & Co., defendant Brush submitted a trademark survey
attempting to show that the name FIRE-SAFE was not-generic.
178
Essentially, the survey found that 44% of consumers were "aware" of
the term FIRE-SAFE. 179 However, plaintiff Stuhlbarg asserted that
several technical issues with the Brush survey warranted finding it
inadmissible. 180  Specifically, Stuhlbarg criticized the types of
questions, in that they did not ask whether the term FIRE-SAFE was a
"brand name" or just a "common name" used to describe a type of
product.18 1 The Ninth Circuit agrees, emphasizing that a genericness
survey should question whether a disputed mark creates "consumer
awareness" as to a specific brand or source.'
82
However, as both the trial court and Ninth Circuit did not have
sufficient information as to (i) the survey's design, (ii) actual
questions asked, and (iii) overall methodology, the court found that
the Brush survey should be "ascribed little weight.' 83 Further, the
court criticized Brush's litigation tactic of failing to present additional
evidence that the term FIRE-SAFE was not generic, including expert
testimony via deposition. 84 Thus, the Ninth Circuit found that the
District Court did not commit an abuse of discretion by finding a
likelihood of success that the term would be generic and thus
unenforceable.
185
B. Survey Must Ask "What Are You" Rather Than "Who Are
You" When Testing Whether a Mark Is Generic.
At least one court within the Ninth Circuit has found that
improper format for survey questions may lead to the exclusion of
survey evidence as to genericness. In Big Island Candies, Inc. v.
Cookie Corner, plaintiff Big Island sued defendants alleging trade
dress infringement regarding its chocolate dipped shortbread cookie
design. 186 Defendant Cookie Corner filed its motion for summary
judgment, arguing that the cookie design was generic and not






184. Stuhlbarg Int'l Sales Co., 240 F.3d at 840.
185. Id.
186. Big Island Candies, Inc. v. Cookie Comer, 269 F. Supp. 2d 1236, 1237 (D. Haw.
2003).
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protectable. 187 In order to prove its cookie acted as a source identifier,
plaintiff proffered the results of a consumer survey.'
88
Under the survey protocol, respondents were first shown a
picture of the plaintiffs cookie wrapped in cellophane with the
printed words "Big Island Candies.' 89  Respondents first asked
whether they had ever seen such a cookie before, and then asked,
"Who makes this product?"'190 Between 16.9-29.4% identified the
plaintiff as making the product.' 91 Defendants criticized the survey
questions in that they essentially asked, "Who are you?" rather than
"What are you?' 192 In analyzing the nature of the plaintiffs survey
questions, the district court found the survey was of no help in
defeating defendant's motion for summary judgment. '93 Specifically,
the format of the questions did not test for genericness.194 A more
acceptable question would have been whether consumers associated
the cookie with a particular. source. 195 Moreover, the inclusion of the
plaintiffs word mark on the test subject was also improper.' 96 As
plaintiffs survey failed to test consumer precepts of the cookie
design, the court found that the design was generic.
97
C. Results in Genericness Surveys Must Show That Greater
Than Fifty Percent of Consumers Identify Good or Service
as Coming From a Specific Brand or Source.
Similar to the percentages required to show secondary meaning,
the Ninth Circuit typically requires over 50% of survey respondents to
identify an implicated good as coming from a specific brand or
source, rather than identifying just a type of good. The Ninth Circuit
in California Cooler, Inc. v. Loretto Winery, Ltd., found that survey
evidence proffered by the plaintiff showing that 75% of relevant
consumers found the name "California Coolers" was a specific brand
of wine cooler amounted to sufficient evidence of a non-generic
187, Id.
188. Id. at 1249-50.
189. Id. at 1250.
190. Id.
191. Id..
192. Big Island Candies, Inc., 269 F. Supp. 2d at 1249-50.
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mark. 198 Likewise, the court in Coca-Cola Co. v. Overland, Inc.,
found that a survey showing that over 76% of consumers sampled
recognized "Coke" as a brand name, rather than a term identifying
soda in general, was sufficient evidence to show the name remains a
Coca-Cola trademark. 199
V. USE OF SURVEYS TO TEST ACTUAL DILUTION
Although courts within the Ninth Circuit routinely rely upon
survey evidence to test confusion, secondary meaning, and
genericness, surveys are seldom used effectively to test for dilution.
Put simply, there exists "no standard criteria for surveying
dilution."200  Often, consumer survey evidence is not necessary to
prove actual dilution, if other circumstantial evidence is available,
especially when the senior and junior marks are identical. 20 1 This is
mainly because it is almost impossible to prepare a proper dilution
survey that effectively detects the requisite "whittling away" found
when dilution supposedly occurs.20 2
In order to prove dilution within the Ninth Circuit, the plaintiff
must establish that:
(1) Plaintiff owns valid registrations of the purported marks;
(2) defendant's marks are a colorable imitation of plaintiffs
marks;
(3) plaintiffs marks are distinctive or have acquired secondary
meaning;
(4) defendant's use was without consent; and
(5) defendant's marks threaten to dilute the distinctiveness of
plaintiffs mark or tarnish its reputation.20 3
198. California Cooler, Inc. v. Loretto Winery, Ltd., 774 F.2d 1451, 1456 (9th Cir. 1985).
199. Coca-Cola Co. v. Overland, Inc., 692 F.2d 1250, 1254 n. 1 (9th Cir. 1982).
200. Hershey Foods Corp. v. Mars, Inc., 998 F. Supp. 500, 518 (M.D. Pa. 1998).
201. Am. Honda Motor Co. v. Pro-Line ProtoForm, 325 F. Supp. 2d. 1081, 1085 (C.D.
Cal. 2004) (citing Moseley v. V Secret Catalogue, Inc., 537 U.S. 418, 434 (2003)).
202. See Quill Natural Spring Water, Ltd. v. Quill Corp., No. 91 C 8071, 1994 WL
559237, at *12-14 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 7, 1994).
203. E. & J. Gallo Winery v. Gallo Cattle Co., 12 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1657, 1675 (E.D.
Cal. 1989).
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As dilution is essentially the erosion of the public's ability to
identify a very strong mark with the mark holder alone, a proper
dilution survey would have to show such whittling away of a mark's
strength. 20 4 Likely, one would have to employ a pre-litigation survey
conducted well before the alleged dilution and a second survey
conducted at the time of the onset of litigation to show the public's
reduced ability to identify the plaintiff's mark.
The only direct discussion by the Ninth Circuit with regard to a
dilution survey occurred in Nissan Motor Co. v. Nissan Computer
Corporation.2°' In Nissan, plaintiff appealed the District Court's
grant of defendant's motion for summary judgment as to trademark
dilution caused by defendant's use of NISSAN for its computer
services.206 Several years prior to the lawsuit, plaintiff had conducted
three Allison-Fisher surveys finding that it enjoyed 55% awareness
among consumers in 1985, 60% consumer awareness in 1986, and
65% awareness in 1991.207 During discovery, plaintiff attempted to
use these three surveys as evidence of famousness, sufficient to prove
trademark dilution.0 8
In evaluating whether such staggered pre-litigation surveys could
be used as evidence in evaluating claims of dilution, the court
cautioned that it could not "say as a matter of law, on this record, and
that the survey, expert, and advertising evidence [would] permit only
the conclusion that the NISSAN mark was famous as of 1991. "209
However, based upon the evidence provided, the Ninth Circuit did
find sufficient genuine issues did exist as to trademark dilution
sufficient to remand to the trial court for further consideration.210
VI. CONCLUSION
The Ninth Circuit will continue to be one of the most influential
courts with regard to the development of trademark survey principles.
Its general rule allowing for admissibility of surveys in general, and
allowing for technical issues with a survey to go towards weight,
represents a distinct difference from other circuits addressing
204. See generally, E. & J. Gallo Winery v. Consorzio del Gallo Nero, 782 F. Supp. 457,
469 (N.D. Cal. 1991).
205. 378 F.3d 1002 (9th Cir. 2004).
206. Id. at 1006-07.
207. Id. at 1014.
208. Id.
209. Id.
210. Nissan Motor Co., 378 F.3d at 1020.
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trademark disputes. While this rule certainly allows the fact finder an
additional source of circumstantial evidence in evaluating a trademark
or trade dress, it also may result in pre-trial laziness. By allowing
survey defects to go only to weight, the Ninth Circuit may have risked
lowering the bar such that undeveloped surveys may be presented to
the factfinder. Furthermore, it may place too many variables into the
hands of a lay jury not experienced in handling the multiple issues
inherent in conducting a proper trademark survey.
The cases highlighted above represent the result of the open
admission of trademark survey evidence. As shown, the Ninth
Circuit's general openness to survey evidence has led to multiple
reversals and remand to the District Court for further consideration.
This often results in greater litigation costs associated with
maintaining a trademark dispute within the circuit. However, it also
leads to more flexibility in how to prepare a trademark survey. As the
arena of trademark survey law continues to expand, especially in the
field of establishing trade dress rights, this general openness within
the Circuit may allow for new methods and tools in executing
surveys. As shown in the recent Clicks Billboards, Inc. v.
SixShooters, Inc., the trademark survey environment has expanded
outside the limitations of the mall or telephone survey, and into the
actual locales in which the implicated goods or services are
purchased.211  Thus, the Ninth Circuit may provide the best
opportunity for development of a proper dilution survey, or for the
protocol in which to conduct an accepted computer-based Internet
survey.
Regardless, the development and use of trademark surveys
remains a pivotal part of maintaining both trademark claims and
defenses. The current trends highlighted in this article only further
support the notion that well executed surveys, conducted in multiple
locations, to the proper universe of consumers, is almost dispositive
of many of the issues found in trademark disputes. The Ninth Circuit
will continue to pave the way in guiding trademark counsel in the
proper methods and roles this tool will play in the practice of
trademark law.
211. Click Billboards, Inc. v. SixShooters, Inc., 251 F.3d 1252 (9th Cir. 2001).
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